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INDEPENDENCE OF JUDICIARY IN THE THIRD WORLD:
THE CASE OF BANGLADESH
Dr. A B. M. Mafizul Islam Patwari*
Many of the third world countries. as colonies of the West were exploited
economically and deprived culturally and scientifically. lIavin~ been oppressed
for centuries when decolonisation
took place pursuant to the Second World
War, these countries proved unable to run the affairs of the Government, they
had no constitutional
sct up, no institutionalised
democratic system, no ideal
political party and no strong leader. As such even today the people of the third
world remain underdeveloped.
The big powers through the weapon of 'Aid', and
with the help of a few civil persons or military officers manipulate third world
economies to their advantage. The role of military in third world politics is also
remarkable. The military, well trained, well educated, well paid and politically
active often overthrow the existin~ govcrnments, and come to power, abrogate
or suspend the existing Constitutions and rule the country year after year in the
name of martial law or in the name of 'democracy' (as President Ayub Khan
called it). Rule according to the whims and fancies of the military ruler is as
such even worse than colonial rule.
The Parliament

too remains

ineffective

as it is litlle more than a rubber

stamp, acting according to the dictates of the Executive. This position is even
worse during the proclamation
of martial law, when the Parliament
may be
suspended or dissolved. A~ainst this anarchical backdrop the independence
of
the 'judiciary of the third world assumes great significance and merits discussion.
INDEPENDENCE
BANGLADESH

OF THE JUDICIARY

The Constitution

of Bangladesh.

UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

OF

1972 "in its original form devised a scheme

of a completely independent judiciary"!. In order to ensure the independence
of
judiciary it has been provided that, "The Chief Justice and the other Judges shall
be independent
in the exercise of their judicial function"~ . Similar provisions
have been made for the subordinate judiciary. Thus there is a Constitutional
acknowled~ment
of the independence
of the judiciary,
both higher and
subordinate. But as the question with regard to separation of subordinate judiciary
from the executive has not been resolved, the acknowledgment
of independence
of the subordinate

judiciary

cannot be fully implemented.

Originally Article 95 (1) provided, "The Chief Justice shall be appointed' by
the President, and the other judges shall be appointed by the President after
Professor. Departmcnt of La\\'. Uni\'crsity of Dhaka,
1.

Justicc Mustafa Kamal. Banl!ladcsh Constitution Trcnds and Issucs 28 (1994)

2.

Articlc 94 (4) of thc Constitution of thc Pcoplc's Rcpublic of Bangladcsh,
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consultation with the Chief Justice". This was a salutary provision which recognised
the principle that the appointments to the Constitutional Court need to be above ..
political considerations
and the Chief Justice as the head of the judiciary is to be
consulted before other judges of this court are to be appointed. The Constitution
(Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975 (Act II of 1975) amended Article 95 (1) and
substituted the following "The Chief Justice and other judges shall be appointed
by the President"]. Though there is no provision in the Constitution
for the
consultation
of the President with the Chief Justice, it is an established practice
that all judges are to be appointed by the President after consultation with the
Chief Justice. Attempt was made in February 1994 to appoint nine Additional
Judges to the High Court Division without consultation with the Chief Justice,
and in pursuance to the protests made from the Bar and Bench the notification
for appointments
were rescinded
consultation with the Chief Justice.

and

fresh

appointments

were

made

in

Original Article 95 (2) provided that a citizen of Bangladesh
being an
advocate of the Supreme Court of not less than ten years standing or a citizen
holding judicial office or being an advocate for not less than ten years in the
territory of Bangladesh and having exercised the powers of a district judge for
not less than three years, was eligible for appointment as a judge. The qualification
was relaxed in order to "accommodate
appointments
not enough to meet the
original Constitutional
requirements'"
Now, the constitutional
requirement
is
that a citizen of Bangladesh being an advocate of the Supreme Court of not less
than ten years standing or a person holding a judicial office for not less than ten
years in the territory of Bangladesh or having such other qualifications as may
be prescribed by law, is eligible for appointment
as a judge. Under original
Article 96 (2), judge was irremovable except by an order of the President passed
pursuant to a resolution of Parliament supported by a majority of not less than
two thirds of the total number of members of Parliament on the ground of
"proved misbehavior or incapacity"". The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act,
1975, amended clause (2) of Article 96 and made a judge removable "by order of
the President on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity" after a show cause.
The Second Proclamation Order (order No.1 of 1977) substituted Article 96 (2)
and (3) which provides that the judges are removable on the ground of incapacity
or gross misconduct on a report submitted to the President by the Supreme
Judicial Council consisting of the Chief Justice and the two next session judges.

judge

The remuneration,
privileges and other terms and conditions of service of a
shall not be varied to his disadvantage
during his term of office. The

3.

Scction 14 of thc Constitution (Fourth Amcndmcnt) Act. 1975.

4.

Sup", n. 1 at P. 30

5.

Scction 15 of thc Constitution (Fourth Amcndmcnt) Act, 1975.
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remuneration,
privileges and other terms and conditions of service of a judge
shall be determined by or under Act of Parliament.li Remuneration
payable to a
judge shall be charged upon the Consolidated Fund which may be discussed in,
but shall not be submitted to thc voice of Parliament.;
Original Article 96 (1) provided that a judge shall hold office until
attained the age of sixty two years. In 1986 this provision of "the age
two years" has been suhstituted for "the age of sixty five years". It means
not removed earlier on the ground of incapacity or gross misconduct
hold office upto the age of sixty five years.

he has
of sixty
if he is
he will

The Constitution ensures that all authorities, executive and judicial, in the
Republic shall act in aid of the Supreme Court.H This has hecn made mandatory
to execute the decisions of thc Suprcme Court because it has no machincry of
its own. Moreovcr the Suprcme Court has been empowercd to colltrol its staff.
Appointments
to the staff of the Supreme Court!' and the conditions of their
servicelO are governed
hy thc n~les of the Supreme CourL. From the ahove
discussion it is observed that the original Constitution
of Bangladesh,
1972,
contained provisions with a view to ensuring the independence
of judiciary.
These safeguards with regard to independence
of judiciary are more or less in
conformity with the norms and standards as set by international
law. It may be
noted that the Constitution
ensured
independence
of judiciary hefore the
movement for independence of judiciary
level
•
t was launched at the intcrnational
and before the Basic Principles of Independence o(.Judiciary, 1.98.1,and United
Nations Draft Declaration of Inclependence of Justice, 1.98.9. wcre adopted
under the United Nations Systcm. In the following pa~es it will be seen how far
the Constitutional
Court, the Supreme
Court has been maintaining
its
independence
in dispensing justice since its establishment
in 1972, within the
framework of the Constitution of Bangladcsh, 1972.
INDEPENDENCE

OF JUDICIARY

IN PRACTICE

Independence of Judiciary under the Original Constitution
As it has been stated earlier. the original Constitution

of Bangladesh

ensured

independence
of judiciary unprecedcnted
in the history of the third world. But
this ideal approach was shattercd and restraints and constraints were imposed
on the Judiciary by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution in early 1975. In

6.

Articlc

147 ot thc Constitution

7.

Articlc

84 rcad with Articles

8.

Articlc

112, Ihid.

9.

Articlc

113 (11. Ihili.

10.

Article

III

ot thc Pcoplc's

Hcpublic

88 and 89.

(2). Ihl<l.
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ot Bangladcsh.

August, martial law was declared throu~hout the country and the Constitution
of Bangladesh remained suspended and the Supreme Court was made suhordinate
to the martial law authority. The martial law was withdrawn in ] 979 and a~ain
imposed in ]982 which continued upto ]9R6. The Constitution
was radically
changed in 1991 re-introducin~ parliamentary democracy which was aholished in
1975 by the Fourth Amendment to thc Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972.
Within the framework of the original Constitution of 1972, the Supreme
Court started to exercise judicial functions independently
and maintained the
status and tradition of thc hi~hest judiciary in the country, the manifestation of
which can be found, as for example, in the case of /l. T. Nridha v the State. 11 In
that case Badrul Haider Chowdhury
J., as he was thcn,
hcld that the
superintending
power of the Iligh Court Divisioll o( the Supreme Court under
Article 109 of the Constitution
was available for correding
measurcs in thc
interest of justice and this powcr was exercisahle over all the courts within the
territories of Ban~ladesh. Where a trihunal had heen set up under a Special Act,
it was the duty of the Iligh Court Division to see in the exercise of its power of
superintendence
that such tribunal acted within the limits of statute creating it
and applied correctly and properly the laws it was authoriscd to administer. The
revisional jurisdiction
under sections 1\:35 and 43~l of the Codc of Criminal
Procedure, ]898, was preserved since it had not hecn takcn away hy the express
words of the Icgislature, thcse sections would come into play whenever interference
was called for. The inhercnt jurisdiction
of the Hi~h Court Division under
Section 56]H of the Code of Criminal Procedure, IWlR, had heen preserved and
this power was available for ancillary and auxiliary purposes for doing justice.
Though the decision of the Iligh Court Division was reversed by the Appellate
Division, 1~ the attempt of the II igh Court Division to establish the authority of
the superior court over special tribunals and to protect the liberty of the people
has been acclaimed with high appreciation. D. C. M. Yardley writes:

"This is clear and vigorous expression of judicial power, and shows that
Bangladesh High Court is as careful as have been the Courts of india and
Pakistan during the recent past to proteclthe liberty of the individual against
excessive use of executive power".
/"I

In this connection

the decision in the case of 1\azin Nukhlesllr

Rahman v

Bangladesh'1 may be mentioned.
demarcation

As soon as the Dclhi Treaty concerning the
of the land boundary between Bangladesh and India and related

11.

11.T /1/ridhu v The Siule. 25 D. I.. It ( 19(3) 335. per Badruillaider

12.

(,'ovemmenl

13.

DC~1 Yardley.

ofllt/ll!l!udesh
"Fundamental

&'.'\.

T .l/ridha.

Ri~hts

26 D. I.. R. S. C.(1971)

and Civil Liberties"

!.uw 62. at p. 74.
14.

26 DLR (5C.) (1974).

44 per Sayelll C. J. at p. 53.
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(] 974)

Chowdhury

J.. at PI'. 375·376.

]7.
]() ..ll1IllIa!

."'·lIrve.ll of Commonwealth

matters was signed, its validity was challenged in the Supreine Court on the
ground that it involved cession of territory which created an impending threat to
the appellant's
fundamental
right to move freely throughout
the territory of
Bangladesh, to reside and sellle in any place therein as well as right of franchise
guaranteed by the Constitution of Bangladesh. On this point Sayem C. observed
that these rights attached to a citizen were not local. they pervaded and extended
to every inch of the territory of Bangladesh stretching upto the continental shelf.
His lordship held that as the terms of the Treaty amounted to cession of territory
to India it could not be implcmcnted
without amending
Articlc 2 of the
Constitution of Bangladcsh, 1972, which defined the territory of the RepublicY'
With a view to enabling the Government to give effect to the Delhi Treaty by
transferring
an area in exchange for two enclaves of Indian territory, as per
decision of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, the Constitution was amended by
the Constitution
(Third Amendment) Act, 1974 (Act LXXIV of ] 9711), which redefined the territory of the Republic by modifying Article 2 (a) of the constitution. II;
The Supreme Court took a valiant stand in interpreting the .Iatiya Rakkhi
Bahini Order, ] 972 (Order XXI of 1972). Ii The said Court madc a strong
comment on the irregular and unsatisfactory manner in which the .Iatiya Rakkhi
Bahini handled the matter and called upon the authority to take effective action
so that a sense of security and assurance prevailed in the minds of the people.
The Court finally observed:

"
The Rakkhi Bahini and the Armed Forces of the country along
with the Police Forces are certainly three most important institutions of the
country which function as part of the State machinery. The reSl)ective shares
of activities must be clearly demarCllted and the mutual relationship of these
bodies must be in accordance with the law of the country. The .Iatiya Rakkhi
can come to the assistance of the Army for the defence of the country as well
as in aid of the Police for the purpose of maintenance of law and order in the
country. The services of the Armed Forces may also be called in aid of by the
civil authority and in accordance with the law of the country. Those bodies
shall have to function according to the direction of the civil authority consistently
with the rights of the people as secured under the Constitution and the general
law as may be appliCllble to such a case"./8
In this way, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in deciding a number of
cases took a valiant stand and tried to establish the rule of law as contemplated

15.

Ihid.

16.

Section

3 of the Constitution

Gazette

Extraordinary.

17.

IThird

NOl'ember

For the lext of the Jatiya

Hakkhi

Amendment)

Act. 197~. For the text of the Act see the Bangladesh

28. 1974.
Bahini

Order.

I !172 see the l3angladcsh

Gazelle.

Extraordinary.

~1arch

7. 1972.
]8.

S. ft/"hsil1

ShurifL'

(;"Venl1l1ell{

,,( n<l"<iIUllesh. 27 DLR (19761186
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per D. C. Bhattacharjia.

at p. 199.

within the framework of the Constitution. This sort of ruling was a great shock
to the executive authority which was determined
to curtail the powers and
jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in particular and judiciary in general as
guaranteed by the Constitution of Bangladesh.

Independence of Judiciary under the Fourth Amendment
Towards the end of 1974, the Government was seriously considering changing
the existing' system of the government.
As a step towards this direction the
President on the 28th December, 1974, issued a Proclamation of Emergencyl!)
and promulgated
an order suspendin~ the enforcement of fundamental rights2t1
and issued the Emergency Powers Ordinance, 1974 (Ordinance XXCII of 1974).21
The declaration of emergency created an atmosphere congenial to introduce a
change of fundamental
nature into the system of government.
On the 25th
January, 1975, the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act was passed at a speed
"unprecedented
in the history of law-making",22 This Act introducing Presidential
system of government inter alia curtailed the jurisdiction of the court to a great
extent. On the question of removal of judges the provision for impeachment was
deleted and the same power was assumed by the President who could remove a
judge including the Chief Justice simply by an order on the ground of misbehaviour
or incapacity.2:1 With regard to the appointment
of additional judges for the
Supreme Court, the President could make the appointment
now without any
consultation with the Chief Justice. In matters of appointment to the subordinate
courts the authority of the Supreme Court was withdrawn. The Amendment
provided: "Appointment of persons to offices in the judicial service or as Magistrate
exercising judicial functions shall be made by the President in accordance with
the rules made by him in that behalf".2~ The power and authority given to the
Supreme Court in the ori~inal Constitution for the. control and discipline of the
subordinate courts including those of the magistrates exercising judicial function,
were now vested in the President instead of the Supreme Court.25 The jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental ri~hts was withdrawn.2li

19.

For the text of the Proclamation
28, 1974.

of Emergency, see the Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary,

20.

For the text of the Order of the President see the B<>ngladesh Gazette Extraordinary,
1974.

December

December 28,

21.

For the text of the Emergency Powers Ordinance see 27 DLR Bangladesh Statutes (!975) 76.

22.

Moudud Ahmed, Ban~ladesh: Era of Sheikh ~1uiibllr Rahman 235 (19840)

23.

Section 14 of the Constitution (Fourth Amendmcilli Act, 1975 which amended Article 95 (I) of the
original Constitution of Bangladesh. 1972.

24.

Ihi,1.Section 19, which amended Article 115.

25.

Ihi,l.Section 20, which amended Article 116.

26.

Ihid. Section 3, which substituted Article 44 in the following: "Parliament may by law establish
Constitutional court, tribunal or commission for the enforcement of the rights by this Part",
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a

Moreover, the Amendment deprived
powers of granting interim ordersY

the Supreme

Court of one of its inherent

The High Court Division's power of superintendence
and control over all
tribunals subordinate to it was withdrawn keeping such power intact only over
the subordinate courts.2X In this way, the long established tradition of independence
of judiciary was curtailed and it was made a subordinate branch of the executive.
One positive aspect of this amendment was that it ensured that all persons
employed in the judicial service and all magistrates "shall be independent
in the
exercise of their judicial function"~!l
The Supreme Court of Bangladesh gave judicial recognition to the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution. In the case of Haji Joynal Abedin v The State,
'it clearly declared. "The guarantee that was given in Article 44 for the enforcement
of the fundamental
rights mentioned in Part III by the machinery provided
under Article 102 was taken away by the Fourth Amendment".:1O In another case
Lutfor Rahman v Election Commissioner, the Supreme Court without questioning
the legality of the promulgation
of the Act moderately raised the question in
respect of making of an interim order. S. M. Husain 1. in that case held:

"By the prohibition imposed under sub-article (2) of Article 102 of the
Constitution as per Fourth Amendment against making any interim order, we,
however, cannot contemplate that this has in any way impaired or abridged
the substantive power of the Court under sub-article (1) to make an order. The
power of the Court to make an order included such consequential powers to
make incidental order in aid of making any final order .. It cannot be presumed
at any stage that the legislature intended to vest the Court with power to make
any final order which may ultimately become infructuous and a futile exercise
in vain ".''11
Only in this above mentioned case the Supreme Court of Bangladesh
showed some courage and raised the question as to the prohibition imposed on
Article 102 of the Constitution as amended by the Fourth Amendment. This sort
of silence preserved by the Supreme Court of Bangladesh strikes the minds of
those who are concerned with the rule of law and independence of judiciary.
Judiciary under the Martial Law
During

the continuance

of emergency

on the

27.

Ihid.Section

17. which amcnded Article 102 (2).

28.

lhid.Scetion

18, Ibid, which amcndcd Article 109.

29.

Ihid.Seetion 21 which amcnded Article 116 A.

30.

30 DLR (1978) 371. per Badrul Haider Cho\\'dhury J, at p. 392.

31.

27 DLR (1975) 27R. pCI' S. ~1.Husain J. at p. 290.
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15th August,

1975,

111

a

military CPM President Sheikh J\1ujibur Hahman along with other members of
his family were assassinated. The country came under the martial law and the
Constitution
of 1~172 was, subject to the martial law proclamations,
regulations
and orders, to continuc to rcmain in force':l~ During this situation the Supreme
Court was in a precarious position. The emergency had been continuing. Special
Power Act, 1974, had already been promulgated
and martial law had been
declared

throughout

the country.

The role the Supreme Court played was forced by a mixed reaction. In a
number of cases, interprclillg cmcrgency provisions the Suprcme Court tried to
protect the liberty of people declaring
detention
orders invalid. Thus, in
interpreting Article 102 of the Constitution of Bangladesh, I\amaluddin I1ossain,
as he then was, in the case of /Ibdull,atif Mizra v Government of Bangladesh
observed that the High Court was to be satisfied that the person in detention
was not so held either "without lawful authority" or "in an unlawfu.1 manner"
these phrases were to be understood keeping in mind that the satisfaction was
that of a judicial authority.11 This satisfaction was to be objective satisfaction:l\
The

reverse

situation

in the case of Mrs.. I!alima

is found

Bangladesh and Others:':' in which the Supreme Court recognised
the supreme

J(hatun v

martial law as

law of the land and held:

"In consequence of these eXl>ressprovisions it would be merely knocking
one:<;head against a stone wall if one makes an alleml>t to get redress in a
court of law which, previous to this regulation, might have granted relief if one
could show that one's property did not come within the purview of the
Abandoned Property (Control, Management and Disposal) ) Order [1972/
The two judgements
are extremely contradictory and in Ilalima Khatun's
case the dignity of the highest judiciary has not been uuly maintaineu and
preserved.
The martial law was withurawn on the 9th April. 1979, anu Civil Covel'llment
continued upto 24th J\larch. 1~IH2, when martial law was again declarcd. The
consequence
of martial law was that the Constitution of 1972 stood suspended
and all proceedings arising out of. and in connection with, writ petitions under
Article 102 of the Constitution had abatcd. Although all existing courts including

32.

POI'

the

tcxt of thc

Affairs !Dhaka:

33.

IIhlle/lIi

Proclalll;rtion

Govcrnlllcnt

I,eltif .l/iu,{

scc

ofl3allgladcsh

v (;/luemmelll

lIalldhook

of Proclalllation.

Prcss.

~linislry

of Law alld

/lO(all.<llae/esh.

31 D. L. H. (1979)

1 PCI' I\alllaiuddin

hc thcn was. at PI'. 8,9.
34.

Mellik ". wi/elm .lilall

1'. L. D. ( 1%7) S. C. 73.: see als/l ,IiiI' ..lhe/1I1 /la</Ili /lalll,.h

P. L .D . (1968) S. C. 3]3. see ells/l IiL'Yllm .lyha
P. L. D. (1%91
35.

.·lhi/1I1 Ilelrim

Sel/lrish f\ashmir

S. C. 14.

30 D. L. H. (S. C.I (19781 2n7. pCI' Fazla

Pariialllclltary

1976) p. 1.

~lunilll as hc thcn was at p. 220.
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Hossain

J .•

as

the Supreme Court were allowed to function their powers and jurisdictions were
subject to the martial law Proclamation, martial law regulations and martial law
Court in the case of Bangladesh
taking into account the political
reality and the precarious conditions existing during the continuance of martial
law gave judicial recognition to the r>1artial Law regime proclaimed on the 24 th
March, 1982.
Orders.:Hi The Appellate

Division of the Supreme

and Another v /lid. Salimul/ah and Othersl;

It may be mentioned that during the continuance of martial law the powers
of the High Court Division to issue orders and directions as contained in the
Article 102 of the Constitution were partially and conditionally revived through
the promulgation
of the Constitution
(partial Hevival) (Second) Order, 1985
(Order I of 1985).1~ l3y this order the fundamental
rights relating to nondiscrimination
on grounds
of religion, equality of opportunity
in public
employment, abolition of tilles. honours and decorations, prohibition of forced
labour, freedom of profession or occupation
and freedom of religion stood
revived.
Eighth

Amendment

The martial

Case and Independence
law was withdrawn

of Judiciary

on the

] Oth Novemher,

] 9RG, and the

controversy
as to the fragmentation
of the Iligh Court Division took a new
shape. The Chief Martial Law Administrator set up several permanent benches of
the Iligh Court Division and the judges were transfered to the six permanent
benches. By the Proclamation
Order No. III these permanent
benches were
designated
as Circuit henches.
When the Constitution
was revived, the
Proclamation Order was no longer valid. Then by notification of the Chief Justice
these six benches became the places where the sessions of the Iligh Court
Division could be held. By other six notifications the jurisdiction to be exercised
by each session and the areas covered by it were specified.
The Constitutional
legal and political

validity of these notifications

circles. In order to consolidate

created

unrest

the position

among the

the Constitution

(Eighth Amendment) Ad, 1988 (Act XXX of 1988)/' was passed by which original
Article 100 was substituted and six permanent benches were set up in the same
places where benches and sessions had been held earlier.

36.

For the text of the Proclamation of ~lartial La\\' see the Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary.
1982.

37.

D. L. R. IA. D.) (1983) 2.

38.

For the text of the Constitution

(partial Rel'il'al) (Second) order.

~1arch 24.

191>5.see the Bangladesh

Gazette

Extraordinary, January 15, ]91>5.
39.

For the text of the Constitution
June 9. 1988.

IEight Amendment) Act, 1988. see Ilangladesh
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Gazette Extraordinary

On the 9th June, 1988, the President

issued notifications

assigning

areas of

the six permanent
benches and on the same date the Chief Justice issued
notifications relating to the permanent benches. The Conslitutional
amendment
and the notifications intensified the unrest and was ultimately challenged before
the High Court Division as ultra vires. The High Court Division summarily
dismissed the petition. Appeal was preferred before the Appellate Division.1/1
The Appellate Division by a majority of three to one struck down the
impugned amendment of Article 100 and the notification as it violated the basic
structure of the Constitution and hence was illegal.
In this way, the Supreme Court restored
independence.
It played a truly historic role.

its dignity

and

preserved

its

It may be mentioned that in February, 1991, Parliamentary
election was
held and in September. 1991, the Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act, 1991
(Act XXII of 1991),~ I was passed according to which the basic structure of the
Constitution
was changed and parliamentary system, which was introduced by
the original Constitution
of 1972 and which was changed by the Fourth
Amendment was re-introduced. Within the framework of the new Constitutional
set-up the independence
of judiciary has been guaranteed. It may be mentioned
that the President is the titular head of the State who under Article 48 (3) has
the power to appoint the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice without anybody's
advice but in all other matters he is to act in accordance
with the Prime
Minister's advice who is the Chief Executive of the Republic. Therefore, it may
be safely stated that the President on advise by the Prime Minister appoints
other judges of the Supreme Court in consultalion with the Chief Justice.
From the above discussion it is clear that the judiciary could not play its
due role due to the Constitulional
crisis created by the ruling authority. On
several occasions the power and jurisdiction of the judiciary was curtailed by the
executive authority and the judiciary had to work in tight confines. This has
created mixed reactions among the people at home and abroad.

Summary and Conclusion
This discussion
context of the third
fact that the judiciary
in the real sense of
due to proclamation

and analysis relating to independence
of judiciary in the
world in general and Bangladesh in particular reveals the
in any volatile society like Bangladesh has no independence
the term. Suspension of the provisions of the Constitution
of emergency or martial law happen therein occasionally,

Chowdhury

v 1I<ll1y/"desh. 41 D.LR. (A.D.) (1989) 165.

40.

Allwar//ussaill

41.

For thc tcxt of thc Constitution (Twclfth Amcndmcnt) Act. 1991. scc Bangladcsh Gazcttc Extraordinary.
Scptcmber 18. 1991.
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the direct impact of which is that the judiciary comes under the executive
authority and serves as a subordinate
branch of the government.
In such a
situation the judiciary as it is revealed from the decision in Mrs. Halima Khatun's
case, has to interpret laws subject to the conditions imposed by the executive
authority. Interest of the public becomes a secondary consideration
and civil
liberties of the citizens are not upheld properly. As a consequence
tyrannical
rules as opposed to rule of law prevails.
In order to overcome this situation, the international
community should
come forward and take steps to safe~uard the independence
of judiciary in the
entire third world. Not only this. the national instruments and documents should
be re-designed in such a way so that no interference
can be made in the
independence
of the judiciary from any quarter. In particular the following steps
are recommended

to be adopted

for the assurance

of independence

of judici~ry< -".
;~' .. ~'

1.

The United Nations Organisation
should adopt a Convention
on the
independence of judiciary which if possible may be compulsorily ratified by
the member States of the United Nations Organisation.
In the proposed
Convention there must be a system of international
supervision as to the
standards of independence
of judiciary to be maintained in any country.
This supervision should be undertaken
by eminent judges, lawyers and
jurists of the world.

2.

Following the UN standard the judiciary should be redesigned with a view
to upholding its independence.
In order to do that the State Constitution
must be amended to provide a guarantee that the judiciary will not be
interfered with in any circumstances. The judiciary, should be the guardian
of the Constitution and its protector even when the martial law is proclaimed
by the military authority. There must be a Constitutional provision that the
judiciary should not recognise the martial law authority. The Judiciary of
Ghana, is a case in point.

3.

The State Constitution
following the international
norms must contain
ruLes relating to fair selection, training, tenure, promotion, and retirement,
remuneration
of the judges of higher and sub-ordinate judiciary.

4.

The judiciary, hi~her and sub-ordinate
must be completely independent
from the executive and the le~islature. The subordinate judiciary including
criminal magistracy must be supervised and controlled by the higher judiciary.

5.

There must not be undue

pressure

on the judiciary

political parties, press and media, general
of its judicial function.
6.

The judicial accountability
there is no discrimination
system of supervision

from groups,

such as

public, army etc. in the discharge

must be ensured by the Constitution
so that
and arbitrariness.
That means there must be a

at the State level.
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all these steps are properly adopted, and there is governmental
will to
ensure independence
of judiciary, the judiciary certainly will be an independent
institution. It will act as the interpreter of the laws of the land in order to ensure
justice under the law, as the upholder of civil liberties of the citizen of the State
as guaranteed
by the national Constitution and the custodian and guardian of
the national Constitution under which it has been established.
If
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